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ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES, TECHNOLOGY AND
PERSONAL PRIVACY
Russell L. Weaver*
Although administrative searches have been conducted since the British colonial
period, modern administrative searches have become potentially more intrusive because
of advances in technology. Agencies still conduct many of the same types of searches
that they have historically conducted. For example, federal administrative officials
screen airline passengers,1 and search liquor stores,2 firearms and ammunition dealers,3
pharmacies,4 employee work sites,5 mines,6 the nation’s borders,7 schools,8 and prisons.9
In addition, state and local officials inspect restaurants (for health and sanitation rea-
sons),10 auto junkyards,11 and the homes of welfare recipients.12 However, in recent
years, new questions have arisen regarding whether administrative inspectors can exam-
ine the contents of electronic devices such as laptops and iPhones.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s administrative-search jurisprudence has been chaotic at
best.13 At times, the Court has expressed doubt about whether the Fourth Amendment
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1 See About TSA, TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
2 See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 73–74 (1970).
3 See Firearms Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO,
FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, http://www.atf.gov/content/Firearms/firearms-enforcement (last vis-
ited Dec. 12, 2013); see also United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 311–12 (1972).
4 See Inspectional Authority; Refusal to Permit Inspection, U.S. FDA, http://www.fda.gov
/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/ucm073839.htm (last visited
Dec. 12, 2013).
5 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OSHA, http://www.osha.gov/dep/index.html (last visited
Dec. 12, 2013); see also Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 309 (1978).
6 See About FMSHRC, FED. MINE SAFETY & HEALTH REVIEW COMM’N, http://www.fmshrc
.gov/about (last visited Dec. 12, 2013); see also Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 596 (1981).
7 See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004); United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 611–12 (1977).
8 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
9 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525–26 (1984).
10 See Camuglia v. City of Albuquerque, 448 F.3d 1214, 1220–21 (10th Cir. 2006).
11 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 707 (1987).
12 See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971).
13 See infra notes 14–22 and accompanying text. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
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should apply to administrative inspections at all. For example, in Frank v. Maryland,14
the Court flatly stated that some administrative inspections, such as municipal fire,
health, and housing inspection programs, “touch at most upon the periphery of the im-
portant interests safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection against official
intrusion.”15 In Frank, the Court was willing to permit administrative inspections be-
cause it concluded that they were accompanied by a long history of public acceptance.16
Although Camara v. Municipal Court17 eventually made it clear that the Fourth Amend-
ment applies to administrative inspections,18 the Court’s administrative-search decisions
have always treated such inspections as an anomaly in the Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.19 In particular, the Court has suggested that administrative searches are
fundamentally different than police searches for evidence of “traditional” crimes such
as robbery, rape, murder, or burglary,20 and the Court has imposed different and lesser
requirements for administrative searches.21 In addition, the Court has upheld warrantless
administrative searches in various contexts.22
In a modern society, the Court’s failure to develop a coherent approach to adminis-
trative inspections creates troubling implications for personal privacy. The difficulty is
illustrated by the so-called border-search exception to the warrant requirement, which
allows customs and immigration officials broad authority to conduct searches at the
U.S. border.23 Concerns regarding the privacy implications of this exception were first
raised by Professors Janet C. Hoeffel and Stephen Singer.24 Every day, thousands of
people enter the United States from other countries.25 In a modern society, driven by
technological innovation, these individuals often carry electronic devices such as lap-
tops, electronic readers, smart phones, and iPads. Not only can these electronic devices
store large amounts of information, they can connect to servers and clouds where
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment’s protections have been incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore are applicable to the states. See Camara v. Mun. Court,
387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963).
14 359 U.S. 360 (1959), overruled by Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
15 Id. at 367.
16 Id. at 364–68.
17 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
18 Id. at 528, 530–31.
19 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623–24 (1886).
20 See, e.g., Frank, 359 U.S. at 365–66.
21 Id. at 372.
22 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 539; N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306,
315–16 (1908); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 37–38 (1905); Compagnie Francaise
de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 387 (1902).
23 See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004); United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
24 See Janet C. Hoeffel & Stephen Singer, Fear and Loathing at the U.S. Border, 82 MISS.
L.J. 833 (2013).
25 See id. at 840 n.35.
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additional information is stored.26 Historically, the U.S. government has exercised
broad authority to search individuals at the border, including their luggage, papers, and
effects.27 In an era of technological innovation, questions have arisen regarding whether
customs officials can review all information stored on electronic devices being carried
across the U.S. border and whether they can retain those electronic devices, or copy the
information stored on them.28 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) takes
the position that it has broad authority to search, retain, or copy electronic information.29
This Article offers a glimpse at the historical underpinnings of the Fourth Amend-
ment, especially in the administrative context and suggests that administrative searches
have historically been treated as stepchildren in the Court’s Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence. The U.S. Supreme Court has been more willing to sustain governmental
actions in the administrative context than it has been willing to sustain in other contexts.
The Article goes on to conclude that, in a modern world that is driven by technological
innovation, the Court’s approach to administrative searches, and in particular to border
searches, threatens to significantly undermine personal privacy.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT CONTEXT
When the history of the Fourth Amendment is analyzed, it is not clear that there is
a clear dividing line between administrative searches and “other” types of searches.
Many of the abuses during the colonial period—abuses that led the new Americans to
demand protections like those ultimately contained in the Fourth Amendment—in-
volved searches of an administrative nature.30 One of the practices that particularly
26 Id. at 843–44 n.52.
27 See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152–53; Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616.
28 See Hoeffel & Singer, supra note 24, at 833–36.
29 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE BORDER
SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES 6–8 (2009) [hereinafter HOMELAND SECURITY ASSESS-
MENT], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_cbp_laptop.pdf.
30 See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 90 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The Fourth
Amendment, in fact, was a direct response to the colonists’ objection to searches of homes under
general warrants or without warrants.”); RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 64–65 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter WEAVER ET AL. (3d ed.)] (“The debate (and the
anger) in the American colonies about the arbitrary use of these writs of assistance by the English
‘was perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the
oppressions of the mother country,’” and “‘[was] fresh in the memories of those who achieved
our independence and established our form of government.’” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 625 (1886))); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990)
(“The driving force behind the adoption of the [Fourth] Amendment . . . was widespread hostility
among the former Colonists to the issuance of writs of assistance . . . . [T]he purpose of the
Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the United States against arbitrary action by
their own Government . . . .”).
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riled the colonists was the fact that colonial officials could obtain “writs of assistance,”
which allowed them to do no more than specify the object of a search and thereby gain
authority to search any place where contraband might be found,31 without limit as to
place or duration.32 Another reviled practice involved the use of “general warrants” that
required colonial officials only to specify an offense and then left it to the discretion
of executing officials to decide which persons should be arrested and which places
should be searched.33
During the colonial period, general warrants and writs of assistance were frequently
used in the administrative context, particularly in searches conducted by customs offi-
cials.34 As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Chadwick,35 “the
Fourth Amendment’s commands grew in large measure out of the colonists’ experience
with the writs of assistance,” which “granted sweeping power to customs officials and
other agents of the King to search at large for smuggled goods.”36 Many of these
searches involved searches of premises and products to determine whether individ-
uals had complied with revenue laws.37 Businesses, subjected to the general warrants,
31 See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168–69 (2008) (“The immediate object of the Fourth
Amendment was to prohibit the general warrants and writs of assistance that English judges
had employed against the colonists . . . .”); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 858 (2006)
(“The pre-Revolutionary ‘writs of assistance,’ which permitted roving searches for contraband,
were reviled precisely because they ‘placed “the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty
officer.”’”); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 339–40 (2001); see also WEAVER
ET AL. (3d ed.), supra note 30, at 64.
32 See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981) (“[T]he writs of assistance used
in the Colonies noted only the object of the search—any uncustomed goods—and thus left cus-
toms officials completely free to search any place where they believed such goods might be.”);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 286 (1967) (“The practice had obtained in the colonies of
issuing writs of assistance to the revenue officers empowering them, in their discretion, to search
suspected places for smuggled goods, which James Otis pronounced ‘the worst instrument of
arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental principles of law,
that ever was found in an English law book;’ since they placed ‘the liberty of every man in the
hands of every petty officer.’” (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625)).
33 See Moore, 553 U.S. at 168–69; Steagald, 451 U.S. at 220; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 608 (1980) (White, J., dissenting) (“[I]t was the abusive use of the warrant power, rather
than any excessive zeal in the discharge of peace officers’ inherent authority, that precipitated
the Fourth Amendment. That Amendment grew out of colonial opposition to the infamous gen-
eral warrants known as writs of assistance, which empowered customs officers to search at will,
and to break open receptacles or packages, wherever they suspected uncustomed goods to be.”).
34 See Payton, 445 U.S. at 583 n.21 (majority opinion).
35 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
36 Id. at 7–8.
37 Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978) (“The particular offensiveness it
engendered was acutely felt by the merchants and businessmen whose premises and products
were inspected for compliance with the several parliamentary revenue measures that most irri-
tated the colonists.”).
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objected vociferously to these inspections.38 In Frank,39 even though the Court con-
cluded that administrative searches stand on the periphery of the Fourth Amendment,40
the Court recognized the importance of administrative inspections to the Fourth Amend-
ment’s history and passage.41 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that administrative
searches should receive less protection because Maryland had long permitted adminis-
trative inspections without a warrant.42
Despite the historical record, the U.S. Supreme Court has given less protection to
businesses and individuals in the administrative context.43 Unquestionably, in a few
cases, the Court has recognized that the Fourth Amendment provides special protection
to businesses.44 As the Court stated in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., “it is untenable that
the ban on warrantless searches was not intended to shield places of business as well
as of residence,”45 and therefore Marshall concluded that Fourth Amendment protec-
tions should be extended to commercial premises.46 Nevertheless, the Court’s general
approach has been to provide fewer protections in the administrative context.
A. The Redefinition of Probable Cause
The Court’s attitude towards administrative searches is reflected in its definition of
“probable cause,” and its application of the “particularity” requirement, in the adminis-
trative context. For searches conducted outside the administrative context, the Court
38 Id. The acts included the Stamp Act of 1765, the Townshend Revenue Act of 1767, and
the Tea Tax of 1773. Id. at 311 n.7; see Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 90 (1987); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 266 (1990).
39 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
40 Id. at 367.
41 Id. at 363. The Court noted that the
history of the constitutional protection against official invasion of the
citizen’s home makes explicit the human concerns which it was meant
to respect. In years prior to the Revolution leading voiced in England and
the Colonies protested against the ransacking by Crown officers of the
homes of citizens in search of evidence of crime or of illegally imported
goods. The vivid memory by the newly independent Americans of these
abuses produced the Fourth Amendment as a safeguard against such arbi-
trary official action by officers of the new Union, as like provisions had
already found their way into State Constitutions.
Id.
42 Id. at 373.
43 See id. at 367. The Court in Frank acknowledged that “for more than 200 years Maryland
has empowered its officers to enter upon ships, carriages, shops, and homes in the service of
the common welfare.” Id.
44 See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1978).
45 Id. at 312.
46 Id.
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has generally imposed a number of requirements on searches and seizures. First, fol-
lowing the language of the Fourth Amendment,47 the Court has recognized that the
Fourth Amendment specifically prohibits only “unreasonable” searches and seizures.48
Second, although the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly require a warrant as a pre-
requisite to a search, the Court has generally imposed a “warrant preference,” meaning
that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.49 Finally, the Court has rela-
tively strictly applied the Fourth Amendment requirements that warrants may not be
issued absent a showing of probable cause and without specifying with particularity
both the place to be searched and the things to be seized.50
In the administrative context, the Court applies these requirements quite differently.
In Camara, the Court acted consistently with its overall jurisprudence in holding that
the Fourth Amendment applies to administrative inspections, that such inspections re-
quire a warrant, and that administrative warrants must be based on probable cause.51
However, the Court more loosely applied the concepts of “probable cause” and “partic-
ularity.” Outside of the administrative context, “probable cause” requires that the deter-
mination of probable cause be person or place specific.52 For an arrest, the government
must show reasonable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
(particular) person to be arrested committed it.53 For a search, the government must
show reasonable cause to believe that the fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime
exist, and can be found at the (particular) place to be searched.54 In other words, as the
Court stated in Illinois v. Gates,55 the question is whether there is “a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”56 Accordingly,
the police do not have cause to search an individual simply because they can show that
a high percentage of individuals in his (seedy) neighborhood sell or use drugs. Instead,
they must show reasonable cause to believe that the particular person to be searched is
in possession of drugs.
47 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
48 See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528–29 (1967).
49 Id. The Court reasoned that “one governing principle, justified by history and by current
experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases,
a search of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been autho-
rized by a valid search warrant.” Id.; see also Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Agnello
v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
50 See, e.g., Camara, 387 U.S. at 528–29.
51 Id. at 534–35.
52 Id. at 534–35, 538.
53 See RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 71 (4th ed. 2012)
[hereinafter WEAVER ET AL. (4th ed.)].
54 Id.
55 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
56 Id. at 238; see also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633,
2639 (2009).
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In the administrative context, the Court does not require that the “probable cause”
be particularized. In Camara,57 a case in which an individual was fined for refusing to
permit a warrantless administrative inspection of his residence for possible viola-
tions of a city housing code, the Court was confronted by a city ordinance which
provided that
employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may
be necessary for the performance of their duties, shall, upon pre-
sentation of proper credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable
times, any building, structure, or premises in the City to perform
any duty imposed upon them by the Municipal Code.58
After holding that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant and that the warrant must
be based on probable cause, the Court then redefined the probable cause requirement
so as not to require a “particularlized” showing of probable cause in the administrative
context.59 For example, in enforcing a housing code, an agency need not show that a
particular building is dilapidated and in need of inspection and possible repair.60 Instead,
the administrative agency can establish probable cause by showing that it has created
reasonable legislative or administrative standards for inspections61—in other words, a
reasonable plan for inspecting aging buildings. Such a plan may involve nothing more
than the fact that it has created a reasonable inspection plan for the area or industry and
that it is time to inspect the premises in question under that plan.62 In order to inspect
buildings in a dilapidated part of the city, a reasonable plan might include such stan-
dards as “the passage of time, the nature of the building (e.g., a multi-family apartment
house), or the condition of the entire area, but [would] not necessarily depend upon spe-
cific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling.” Even though a particular
building might have been completely updated, so that there is virtually no risk of dilapi-
dation or deterioration, an administrative agency might still have “probable cause” to
obtain a warrant to inspect it. In the Court’s view, this revised probable cause standard
serves a valid purpose by guaranteeing “that a decision to search private property is
justified by a reasonable governmental interest.”63
In altering the probable cause requirement, the Court emphasized several things.
First, it balanced the need to search “against the invasion which the search entails.”64
Second, the Court found that administrative inspections “have a long history of judicial
57 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
58 Id. at 526.
59 Id. at 538.
60 Id. at 534.
61 Id. at 538.
62 See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978).
63 Camara, 387 U.S. at 539.
64 Id. at 537.
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and public acceptance,”65 and the Court doubted that “any other canvassing technique
would achieve acceptable results.”66 The Court noted that many conditions (i.e., faulty
wiring) “are not observable from outside the building and indeed may not be apparent
to the inexpert occupant himself.”67 In addition, administrative inspections are not fo-
cused on the discovery of evidence, and “involve a relatively limited invasion of the
urban citizen’s privacy.”68
The Court’s redefinition of probable cause in the administrative context might rea-
sonably have been expected. In a number of prior cases, the Court had recognized the
need for administrative inspections.69 For example, in Frank, the Court stated that:
The growth of cities, the crowding of populations, the increased
awareness of the responsibility of the state for the living conditions
of its citizens, all have combined to create problems of the en-
forcement of minimum standards of far greater magnitude than
the writers of these ancient inspection laws ever dreamed. Time
and experience have forcefully taught that the power to inspect
dwelling places, either as a matter of systematic area-by-area
search or, as here, to treat a specific problem, is of indispensable
importance to the maintenance of community health; a power
that would be greatly hobbled by the blanket requirement of the
safeguards necessary for a search of evidence of criminal acts. The
need for preventive action is great, and city after city has seen this
need and granted the power of inspection to its health officials;
and these inspections are apparently welcomed by all but an
insignificant few.70
Moreover, there is considerable pressure for administrative agencies to conduct “pre-
ventive” inspections.71 Governmental officials could wait until individuals become sick
or die before they inspect restaurants for clean and healthy conditions. Likewise, they
could wait until an elevator crashes before conducting elevator safety inspections. How-
ever, for understandable reasons, governments prefer to do preventative inspections of
restaurants and elevators in an effort to prevent sickness or injury.72
It is important not to read too much into the prevention justification. Outside of the
administrative context, government may have a similarly compelling “need” to conduct
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See, e.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 372 (1959).
70 Id. at 371–72.
71 Id. at 372.
72 See Camuglia v. City of Albuquerque, 448 F.3d 1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2006).
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searches. As Justice Douglas recognized, dissenting in Frank, even though health in-
spections are important,
they are hardly more important than the search for narcotic ped-
dlers, rapists, kidnappers, murderers, and other criminal ele-
ments. . . . Many today would think that the search for subversives
was even more important than the search for unsanitary conditions.
It would seem that the public interest in protecting privacy is equal-
ly as great in one case as in another. The fear that health inspec-
tions will suffer if constitutional safeguards are applied is strongly
held by some.73
Nevertheless, Camara’s holding might have been better than the alternative. Be-
cause of the decision in Frank, there was a risk that the Court might simply have de-
clared that the Fourth Amendment had no application to administrative inspections. In
other words, rather than simply applying a lower standard of probable cause, the Court
might have held that administrative inspections were not subject to the warrant require-
ment at all. As a result, administrative agencies could simply have chosen to inspect
regulated entities at will and without a warrant. The requirement of a warrant, along
with the redefined notions of probable cause and particularity, provided a substantial
protection against administrative abuse. In theory, at least, that requirement prevents
governmental officials from simply picking on their political enemies by subjecting
them to frequent warrantless searches. In order to obtain a warrant, the agency must
show that it has established a reasonable inspection plan, and that it is time to inspect
this particular business under that plan.74 Of course, the reality is that most administra-
tive inspections are conducted without a warrant based on the consent of the person or
business being searched.75 Nevertheless, the warrant requirement, and the ability of a
business to refuse consent, provides businesses with substantial protections if they
choose to invoke that requirement.
B. Exception for “Pervasively Regulated Businesses”
A second area where the Court has chosen to single out administrative searches for
special treatment involves the exception for so-called “pervasively regulated busi-
ness[es]”76 or “closely regulated industr[ies]” that have “long [been] subject to close
supervision and inspection.”77 The Court has stated that these industries “have such a
73 Frank, 359 U.S. at 382 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
74 See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
75 Id. at 539 (“[M]ost citizens allow inspections of their property without a warrant.”).
76 See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
77 See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 74, 77 (1970).
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history of government oversight that [the owner can have] no reasonable expectation
of privacy,”78 and therefore the government can search them without a warrant.79 As the
Court has stated, “[W]hen an entrepreneur embarks upon such a business, he has
voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation . .
. of which any person who chooses to enter such a business must already be aware.”80
Included are such enterprises as liquor sales and distribution,81 firearms,82 as well as
underground and surface mines.83 However, in Marshall, the Court refused to apply the
exception to inspections conducted under the Occupational Safety and Health Act.84
Perhaps the outer limits of the “closely regulated” industry exception were estab-
lished in New York v. Burger. That case involved a junkyard that dismantled cars and
sold car parts.85 Police officers from the New York City Police Department sought to
inspect the junkyard pursuant to a New York law that authorized warrantless in-
spections of junkyards.86 During the inspection of Burger’s business, the officers
copied down the vehicle identification numbers on a number of vehicles that were
subsequently determined to be stolen.87 Based on this evidence, Burger was charged
with possession of stolen property and operation of a junkyard in non-compliance with
state law (requiring the maintenance of a “police book” etc.).88 In upholding the search,
the Court held that junkyards qualified as “closely regulated” businesses because, in
addition to other requirements, junkyards were required to maintain a police book
showing their acquisition and disposition of motor vehicles and vehicle parts, and they
were required to make these records and inventory available for inspection by the police
and other government agents.89 The Court concluded that junkyards were “closely regu-
lated” even though junkyards and vehicle dismantlers had not been in existence very
long and therefore did not have a long history of regulation.90 The Court viewed the in-
dustry as similar to secondhand shops and general junkyards which “long have been
78 Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See Colonnade Catering Corp., 397 U.S. at 73–74.
82 See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 311 (1978).
83 See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 596 (1981).
84 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 315 (“What is observable by the public is observable, without a
warrant, by the Government inspector as well. The owner of a business has not, by the necessary
utilization of employees in his operation, thrown open the areas where employees alone are per-
mitted to the warrantless scrutiny of Government agents. That an employee is free to report, and
the Government is free to use, any evidence of noncompliance with OSHA that the employee
observes furnishes no justification for federal agents to enter a place of business from which the
public is restricted and to conduct their own warrantless search.” (footnotes omitted)).
85 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
86 Id. at 693.
87 Id. at 695.
88 Id. at 704.
89 Id. at 703–04.
90 Id. at 705–07.
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subject to regulation.”91 As a result, the Court found that junkyard owners engaged in
dismantling have a reduced expectation of privacy.92
After concluding that dismantling was a closely regulated business, the Court ex-
amined the New York statute to determine whether it met the three criteria for warrant-
less inspections of closely regulated businesses.93 The Court found a “substantial
interest in regulating the vehicle-dismantling and automobile-junkyard industry because
motor vehicle theft has increased in the State and because the problem of theft is asso-
ciated with this industry.”94 The State could reasonably find that “regulation of the
vehicle-dismantling industry reasonably serves the State’s substantial interest in eradi-
cating automobile theft.”95 It reasoned that “stolen cars and parts often pass quickly
through an automobile junkyard, [and] ‘frequent’ and ‘unannounced’ inspections are
necessary in order to detect them.”96 In addition, the statute provided a “constitutionally
adequate substitute for a warrant.”97 The statute “inform[ed] the operator of a vehicle
dismantling business that inspections [would] be made on a regular basis” and provided
details regarding the scope of the inspections.98 Finally, the Court held that the “time,
place, and scope”99 of the inspection was limited “to plac[ing] appropriate restraints
upon the discretion of the inspecting officers.”100 Inspections were limited to regular
business hours, and the scope of the search was narrowly defined: The inspectors could
examine the records, as well as “any vehicles or parts of vehicles which are subject to
the record keeping requirements of this section and which are on the premises.”101
The Burger decision was extraordinary because the search did not involve a typical
administrative inspection by a traditional administrative agency, but instead involved
police searches for evidence of criminal activity. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the
searches as administrative inspections: “[A] State can address a major social problem
both by way of an administrative scheme and through penal sanctions.”102 “So long as
a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that
the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those
created by the scheme itself.”103
Justice Brennan, dissenting, questioned whether vehicle dismantlers really qual-
ify as closely regulated businesses.104 He noted that the regulations governing their
91 Id. at 706.
92 Id. at 707.
93 Id. at 708–12.
94 Id. at 708.
95 Id. at 709.
96 Id. at 710.
97 Id. at 711 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981)).
98 Id. (citing Donovan, 452 U.S. at 605).
99 Id. (quoting United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972)).
100 Id. (citing Donovan, 452 U.S. at 605).
101 Id. at 711–12.
102 Id. at 712.
103 Id. at 717.
104 Id. at 718 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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existence were not extensive: “Few substantive qualifications are required of an aspiring
vehicle dismantler; no regulation governs the condition of the premises, the method of
operation, the hours of operation, the equipment utilized, etc. This scheme stands in
marked contrast to, e. g., [sic] the mine safety regulations relevant in Donovan v.
Dewey.”105 In addition, he questioned whether there was any assurance that inspections
would be conducted on a regular basis, or at all.106 In other words, the statute provided
no “constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.”107 Finally, he noted that the law
authorized searches intended solely to uncover evidence of criminal acts: “[T]he State
has used an administrative scheme as a pretext to search without probable cause for evi-
dence of criminal violations.”108
C. Emergency Exception
The Court has also recognized that there are a number of situations in the admin-
istrative context when warrantless inspections are constitutionally permissible. For
example, a warrant is not required in “emergency situations” involving the seizure of
unwholesome food, smallpox vaccinations, health quarantines, or the summary destruc-
tion of tubercular cattle.109
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXCEPTION AND PERSONAL PRIVACY: WARNING
SIGNALS FROM THE BORDER EXCEPTION DEBATES
It is tempting to view the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as sui generis
as it has been applied in the administrative context. In other words, or so the argument
goes, the administrative exception applies in limited contexts that often (although not
exclusively) affect only businesses.110 The difficulty is that, in a modern society, in-
volving technological advancement and innovation, the dividing line between adminis-
trative searches and “other” searches is not clear or well-defined. In one area of the
law—border searches—the administrative exception has the potential to dramatically
limit individual privacy.
105 Id. at 721.
106 Id. at 722.
107 Id. (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981)).
108 Id. at 725.
109 See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967). The Court recognized the impor-
tance of “prompt [administrative] inspections, even without a warrant, . . . in emergency situ-
ations.” Id. (citing N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (seizure
of unwholesome food); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of Health,
186 U.S. 380 (1902) (health quarantine); Kroplin v. Truax, 165 N.E. 498 (Ohio 1929) (summary
destruction of tubercular cattle)).
110 See, e.g., David A. Christensen, Warrantless Administrative Searches Under Environ-
mental Laws: The Limits to EPA Inspectors’ Statutory Invitation, 26 ENVTL. L. 1019, 1033
(1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding administrative searches of com-
mercial property reveal that warrantless inspection “is reasonable only under statutes that target
specific industries”).
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The exception for border searches illustrates the potential privacy implications of
the administrative exception. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the government’s
power is at its zenith at the border and that the government retains broad powers to
search those who seek to enter or transport goods into the country.111 As the Court
stated in United States v. Flores-Montano, “searches made at the border, pursuant to the
longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons
and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that
they occur at the border.”112
Undoubtedly, the government has substantial justifications for stopping individuals
at the border, as well as for making inquiries and conducting searches. Government has
the right to ensure that those seeking to enter the United States are actually authorized
to do so and therefore to demand that those seeking entry prove their right to do so.113
In addition, the United States has always retained the right to ensure that contraband
and potentially dangerous items do not enter the United States.114 As a result, the United
States has reserved to itself the power to inspect bags and other items brought into the
United States.115
Because of this attitude, the Court has regarded border searches as “routine”116 and
has generally allowed customs officials to exercise broad powers.117 For example, cus-
toms officials may search individuals and their luggage at the border whether or not
they have particularized cause to suspect wrongdoing.118 As the Court recognized in
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs119:
111 See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004).
112 Id. (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
113 See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 (“Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international
boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to
identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully
brought in.” (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925))); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) (noting that it is “without doubt” that the power to ex-
clude aliens “can be effectuated by routine inspections and searches of individuals or convey-
ances seeking to cross our borders”).
114 See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618–19.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 619.
117 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (“Routine searches
of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion,
probable cause, or warrant . . . .”); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413
U.S. 123, 125 (1973) (“Import restrictions and searches of persons or packages at the national
borders rest on different considerations and different rules of constitutional law from domestic
regulations. The Constitution gives Congress broad, comprehensive powers ‘[t]o regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations.’ Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Historically such broad powers have been neces-
sary to prevent smuggling and to prevent prohibited articles from entry.”).
118 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538; Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272–73.
119 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
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[A] port of entry is not a traveler’s home. His right to be let alone
neither prevents the search of his luggage nor the seizure of unpro-
tected, but illegal, materials when his possession of them is dis-
covered during such a search. Customs officers characteristically
inspect luggage and their power to do so is not questioned in this
case; it is an old practice and is intimately associated with exclud-
ing illegal articles from the country.120
The Court has suggested that it might impose more rigorous requirements on
searches that are deemed to be “unreasonable” because of the “particularly offensive
manner” in which they are conducted.121 Included within these latter searches are strip,
body-cavity, or involuntary X-ray searches.122
The difficulty is that, as the nature of the “items” crossing international borders has
changed as technology has changed, the Court’s jurisprudence has not.123 Instead of car-
rying ordinary goods across U.S. borders, individuals now carry many different types
of electronic devices with them. In addition to iPhones and cellphones, it is not uncom-
mon for international travelers to go through customs carrying digital cameras, laptop
and notebook computers, Kindles (and other book readers), and iPads.124 Many of these
items contain not only large amounts of personal information but also highly confiden-
tial information.125 Moreover, since many electronic devices are connected to servers
or to cloud storage systems, it is possible to access an extraordinary quantity of informa-
tion through these devices.126
120 Id. at 376.
Border searches, then, from before the adoption of the Fourth Amend-
ment, have been considered to be “reasonable” by the single fact that the
person or item in question had entered into our country from outside.
There has never been any additional requirement that the reasonableness
of a border search depended on the existence of probable cause. This long-
standing recognition that searches at our borders without probable cause
and without a warrant are nonetheless “reasonable” has a history as old as
the Fourth Amendment itself. We reaffirm it now.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619 (footnote omitted).
121 See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 n.13.
122 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 n.4; see also United States v. Sandler, 644
F.2d 1163, 1169 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the permissibility of a warrantless pat-down and
search of outer clothing should not be necessarily extended to more intrusive searches).
123 See, e.g., United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2013), petition for
cert. filed Aug. 5, 2013 (acknowledging that it was prescient to incorporate “papers” within the
Fourth Amendment’s purview, but that people crossing American borders today, as “denizens
of a digital world,” carry many electronic devices).
124 Id. at 956.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 965.
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Does the federal government have an absolute right to search these electronic de-
vices simply because they are being carried into the United States? One can argue that
the “writings” contained on electronic devices are no different from written manuscripts
that might have entered the country in eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, and that might
have been subject to search at that time. On the other hand, one can also argue that elec-
tronic devices are distinct in important respects. For one thing, electronic devices can
store far more information. If the government has the “right” to search all electronic de-
vices, then legitimate questions might be raised regarding the scope of that right. Are
customs officials only allowed to do a cursory inspection? Alternatively, can they seize
electronic devices and send them off to forensics labs for detailed analysis of their con-
tent? Can they copy electronic files from a laptop and review them at their leisure?
In the physical search cases, the Court has held that customs officials have broad
authority to conduct extensive border searches.127 For example, in Flores-Montano,
when customs officials believed that Flores-Montano was carrying contraband in the
gas tank of his automobile, the Court held that those officials could remove and disas-
semble the gas tank.128 The Court flatly stated that an individual’s expectation of pri-
vacy is lower at the border because the Court has “long recognized that automobiles
seeking entry into this country may be searched.”129 The Court viewed the search of a
gas tank as no more intrusive than the search of an automobile’s passenger compart-
ment and concluded “that the disassembly and reassembly of [the] gas tank [did not
involve] a significant deprivation” of property even though the vehicle could have been
damaged.130 The Court believed that any damage that the search caused could have
been “justified by the Government’s paramount interest in protecting the border.”131
The Court left open the possibility that some searches of property could be “so destruc-
tive as to require a different result.”132
A. Border Searches for Information Making Accompanied Crossings of the
U.S. Border
Might similar principles justify inspection and examination of the information con-
tained on electronic devices? In United States v. Adams,133 a lower court held that the
border search doctrine gives the government the power to search through private files
and documents.134 In that case, governmental officials confiscated and searched Adams’
address book, which they found on a small private plane that flew into the United
States.135 The search revealed the name of a co-conspirator in the drug-smuggling
127 See supra notes 113–20 and accompanying text.
128 541 U.S. 149, 150–51, 155 (2004).
129 Id. at 154.
130 Id. at 154–55.
131 Id. at 155.
132 Id. at 155–56.
133 1 F.3d 1566 (11th Cir. 1993).
134 Id. at 1574, 1577.
135 Id. at 1577.
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operation.136 The Court held that a warrantless search of an airplane that had entered the
United States was a valid border search and that government had broad authority to
search the plane.137
The U.S. government’s view is that there should be no significant distinction, in
terms of the analytical approach, between looking at an address book and searching
through a traveler’s computer files.138 In its assessment, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) flatly states that:
The advent of compact, large capacity, and inexpensive electronic
devices, such as laptop computers, thumb drives, compact disks
(CD), digital versatile disks (DVD), cell phones, subscriber identity
module (SIM) cards, digital cameras, and other devices capable of
storing electronic information (hereinafter “electronic devices”) has
enabled the transportation of large volumes of information, some
of which is highly personal in nature. When these devices are car-
ried by a traveler crossing the U.S. border, these and all other be-
longings are subject to search by the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) to ensure the enforcement at the border of immi-
gration, customs, and other federal laws.139
Even though the DHS recognizes that searches of electronic devices raise signi-
ficant privacy concerns,140 the DHS believes that such searches are justified by
136 Id.
137 It is clear that the search was a valid border search, one for which a war-
rant was not required. “The fact that one is in the process of crossing an
international boundary provides sufficient reason in itself to permit a
search for aliens or contraband, without the presence of any other circum-
stance that would normally have to attend the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.” United States v. Moreno, 778 F.2d 719, 721 (11th Cir.
1985) (quoting United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir.
1972)). “Such a search is reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes sim-
ply because a border has been crossed. The mere fact that in this case the
search did not technically occur at the border is irrelevant; the point where
[the defendant] ultimately landed his aircraft is construed as the functional
equivalent of the border.”
Id.; see United States v. Hewitt, 724 F.2d 117, 119 (11th Cir. 1984); see also United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
138 See, e.g., HOMELAND SECURITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 2.
139 Id.
140 There are two basic privacy concerns at the heart of DHS search-
ing electronic devices at the border. The first is the propriety of the bor-
der search, as in whether the search is lawful under U.S. law. The legal
foundation for border searches of any object at the border, regardless
of its type, capacity, or format, is well-established and is discussed in
detail below.
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the fact that illegal information can be carried across the nation’s borders on elec-
tronic devices.141
How much power does the DHS possess regarding these computer devices? The
Department takes the position that it has broad authority to search and inspect them. For
one thing, even when the DHS inspects an electronic device, it is not always required
to inform the traveler of this fact.142 In addition, the DHS takes the position that it has
the authority to detain an electronic device for further inspection, or to copy the infor-
mation contained on that device for later review and inspection.143 Ordinarily, this
The second and more central privacy concern is the sheer volume and
range of types of information available on electronic devices as opposed
to a more traditional briefcase or backpack. In the past, someone might
bring a briefcase or similar accessory across the border that contains pic-
tures of their friends or family, work materials, personal notes or journals,
or any other type of personal information. Because of the availability of
electronic information storage and the capacity for comfortable portability,
the amount of personal and business information that can be hand-carried
by a single individual has increased exponentially. Where someone may
not feel that the inspection of a briefcase would raise significant privacy
concerns because the volume of information to be searched is not great,
that same person may feel that a search of their laptop increases the possi-
bility of privacy risks due to the vast amount of information potentially
available on electronic devices.
Id. (footnote omitted).
141 At the same time that individuals seek to lawfully transport electronic in-
formation with no link to criminal activity across the border, criminals
attempt to bring merchandise contrary to law into the United States using
the same technology. The use of electronic devices capable of storing
information relating to criminal activities has been established as the latest
method for smuggling these materials. As the world of information tech-
nology evolves, the techniques used by CBP and ICE and other law
enforcement agencies must also evolve to identify, investigate, and prose-
cute individuals using new technologies in the perpetration of crimes. Fail-
ure to do so would create a dangerous loophole for criminals seeking to
import or export merchandise contrary to law.
Id. at 2–3.
142 Id. at 4 (“In many instances, CBP and ICE conduct border searches of electronic devices
with the knowledge of the traveler. However, in some situations it is not practicable for law en-
forcement reasons to inform the traveler that his electronic device has been searched.”).
143 A detention occurs when CBP or ICE determines that the devices need to
be kept for further examination to determine if there is probable cause to
seize as evidence of a crime and/or for forfeiture. This is a temporary
detention of the device during an ongoing border search. Many factors
may result in a detention, for example, time constraints due to connecting
flights, the large volume of information to be examined, the need to use
off-site tools and expertise during the search (e.g., an ICE forensic lab), or
the need for translation or other specialized services to understand the
information on the device. In a detention, CBP or ICE will keep either
the original device (e.g., the laptop) or an exact duplicate copy of the
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detention should not exceed five days, but the DHS reserves the right to share contents
stored on the device with other administrative agencies, and to retain electronic devices
for up to thirty days.144 Detentions beyond thirty days “must be approved by an ICE
supervisor, approved again every 15 days thereafter, and documented in the appropri-
ate ICE record systems.”145 Instead of detaining a device, the DHS can elect to copy the
electronic contents for later review.146 In some instances, the DHS has the power to
destroy electronic information.147 In the final analysis, such searches, detentions, and
copying are relatively routine:
As federal criminal investigators, ICE Special Agents are empow-
ered to make investigative decisions based on the particular facts
and circumstances of each case. The decision to detain or seize
electronic devices or detain, seize, or copy information therefrom
is a typical decision a Special Agent makes as part of his or her
basic law enforcement duties.148
Thus far, there is some disagreement between the cases, but some decisions suggest
that the DHS has broad authority to inspect electronic devices. In United States v.
information stored on the device, so as to allow the traveler to proceed
with the original device. Once the border search has concluded, the de-
vice will be returned to the traveler unless there is probable cause to seize
the device. Any copies of the information in the possession of CBP or
ICE will be destroyed unless retention of the information is necessary for
law enforcement purposes and appropriate within CBP or ICE Privacy
Act systems of records.
Id. at 5.
144 Id. at 7 (“In most cases, when CBP or ICE keeps the device and the traveler leaves the port
without it, the electronic device is considered ‘detained.’ For CBP, the detention of devices
ordinarily should not exceed five (5) days, unless extenuating circumstances exist.” (footnote
omitted)).
145 Id. at 9 (footnote omitted).
146 Instead of detaining the electronic device, CBP or ICE may instead copy
the contents of the electronic device for a more in-depth border search at
a later time. For CBP, the decision to copy data contained on an electronic
device requires supervisory approval. Copying may take place where CBP
or ICE does not want to alert the traveler that he is under investigation;
where facilities, lack of training, or other circumstances prevent CBP or
ICE from performing the search at secondary inspection; or where the
traveler is unwilling or is unable to assist, or it is not prudent to allow the
traveler to assist in the search (such as providing a password to log on to
a laptop).
Id. at 8 (footnote omitted).
147 Id. at 10 (“Detained electronic information that is destroyed is not merely deleted, but fo-
rensically wiped, which entails writing over the information multiple times to ensure it cannot
be accessed again. Once the electronic copy is forensically wiped, a record of the destruction is
documented in the TECS Report of Investigation (ROI), as appropriate.” (footnote omitted)).
148 Id. at 8.
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Cotterman, a husband and wife, who were traveling under U.S. passports, tried to cross
from Mexico into the United States.149 Customs officials decided to seize their laptops
and digital cameras and send those devices to a forensics lab in another city for forensic
examination.150 Although the husband offered to help customs officials access the lap-
tops by providing passwords, the officials declined for fear that defendant would tamper
with or delete content, and also because they feared that “the laptops might be ‘booby
trapped’” or that “there might be files [they] would be unable to see even with full ac-
cess to the laptops.”151 Although defendants were allowed entry into the United States,
their electronics equipment was shipped to Tuscon (170 miles away), a place where
defendants happened to be going, and two of the laptops were held for four days.152
It is one thing if courts strictly circumscribe searches of computers and other digital
equipment based on a warrant and probable cause. However, in Cotterman, customs of-
ficials did not obtain a warrant.153 Moreover, although the government had a basis for
believing that the husband might be carrying child pornography on his electronic de-
vices, the government freely admitted that it did not have a “particularized suspicion”
of criminal activity.154 Indeed, the government argued that it was not required to show
cause because the border-search doctrine gave it the power to seize the computer,
carry it to a distant location for analysis, and complete the search.155 As a result, the
government argued that its actions should be regarded as “reasonable” under the
Fourth Amendment.156
The opinions in the Cotterman case—the trial court opinion and the appellate
opinion—offer much insight into the conflicting ways that courts evaluate this type
of case. In sustaining the seizure, the trial court gave short shrift to Cotterman’s ob-
jections.157 The court began by reaffirming the breadth of governmental power under
the border-search doctrine:
We need not dwell long on the general scope of the Government’s
border search power. It is well-established that the sovereign need
not make any special showing to justify its search of persons and
property at the international border. Rather, it is the traveler who
149 637 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013).
150 Id. at 1071–72. The seizure was based on information found in a government database, in-
dicating that Cotterman had been convicted of two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct upon
a child, and three counts of child molestation, and suggesting that customs officials be on the
“lookout” for child pornography. Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 1070, 1072.
153 Id. at 1071–72.
154 Id. at 1071, 1074.
155 Id. at 1074.
156 Id. at 1081.
157 Id. at 1076.
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must demonstrate he is entitled to cross our borders and to bring
with him whatever he may wish to carry.158
Indeed, the court made it clear that it would have routinely upheld the inspection of
Cotterman’s computer had the inspection been done at the international border.159 In
other words, customs officials could have searched Cotterman’s electronic information
on his laptops and cameras.
The court then examined whether customs officials could seize Cotterman’s elec-
tronic equipment at the border, transport it to another city for forensics analysis, and
ultimately hold on to it for several days.160 Cotterman claimed that the actions of cus-
toms officials were unreasonable and therefore a violation of the Fourth Amendment.161
The court disagreed, noting that the government has broad authority to seize property
at the nation’s borders.162 The court also held that a traveler does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his luggage when he crosses the nation’s borders.163 Since
Cotterman was never allowed to enter the country with his electronic equipment, he
never regained his expectation of privacy with regard to that equipment.164 “Quite to
the contrary, the Court has indicated that travelers should expect intrusions and delay
158 Id. at 1074–75 (citations omitted).
159 Id. at 1075–76.
160 Id. at 1076–79.
161 Id. at 1076.
162 As a preliminary matter, we readily dispense with Cotterman’s claim—
and the first of three principal arguments relied upon by the dissent—that
the Government may search property at the border, but is powerless to
seize property to adequately conduct its search absent some particularized
suspicion. Quite to the contrary, we note that the Supreme Court has
explicitly recognized that the Government possesses inherent authority
to seize property at the international border without suspicion: “Since the
founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary
authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without
probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties
and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country.”
Id. at 1075 n.9 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S.
531, 537 (1985)).
163 Id. at 1077; see also United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n.3 (2004)
(rejecting the contention that there is a “Fourth Amendment right not to be subject to delay
at the international border”); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537
(1985) (“[T]he Executive [has] plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the
border . . . .”); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982) (“The luggage carried by a
traveler entering the country may be searched at random by a customs officer . . . no matter how
great the traveler’s desire to conceal the contents may be.”); United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (“But a port of entry is not a traveler’s home. His right
to be let alone neither prevents the search of his luggage nor the seizure of unprotected, but
illegal, materials when his possession of them is discovered during such a search.”).
164 Cotterman, 637 F.3d at 1077.
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in order to satisfy the Government’s sovereign interest in protecting our borders from
those who would wish to do us harm.”165 The court refused to impose any additional re-
quirements as a precondition to a decision to remove property away from the border for
further inspection.166
The trial court decision in Cotterman was subsequently overturned by the Ninth
Circuit in a decision that recognized the privacy implications raised by the situation.167
The court of appeals sought to balance the government interest in protecting the borders
against the individual interest in privacy, and to determine whether the actions of cus-
toms officials should be regarded as “reasonable,” as required by the Fourth Amend-
ment.168 In light of this balancing, the court held that border agents are free to do a
quick scan of electronic devices, including looking at the contents.169 However, the
court suggested that the forensic examination of the computer at a remote site could not
be regarded as an “extended border search”170 and therefore required greater cause.171
165 Id. at 1078.
166 Id.
167 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013).
168 Id. at 960–61.
169 [T]he legitimacy of the initial search of Cotterman’s electronic devices
at the border is not in doubt. Officer Alvarado turned on the devices and
opened and viewed image files while the Cottermans waited to enter the
country. It was, in principle, akin to the search in Seljan, where we con-
cluded that a suspicionless cursory scan of a package in international
transit was not unreasonable. 547 F.3d at 1004. Similarly, we have ap-
proved a quick look and unintrusive search of laptops. United States v.
Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir.2008) (holding border search rea-
sonable where “CBP officers simply ‘had [traveler] boot [the laptop] up,
and looked at what [he] had inside.’”) (second alteration in original).
Had the search of Cotterman’s laptop ended with Officer Alvarado, we
would be inclined to conclude it was reasonable even without particu-
larized suspicion.
Id.
170 Although the semantic moniker “extended border search” may at first
blush seem applicable here, our jurisprudence does not support such a
claim. We have “define[d] an extended border search as any search away
from the border where entry is not apparent, but where the dual require-
ments of reasonable certainty of a recent border crossing and reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity are satisfied.” United States v. Guzman-
Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2009). . . . Cotterman’s case is
different. Cotterman was stopped and searched at the border. Although he
was allowed to depart the border inspection station after the initial search,
some of his belongings, including his laptop, were not. The follow-on fo-
rensic examination was not an “extended border search.” A border search
of a computer is not transformed into an extended border search simply
because the device is transported and examined beyond the border.
Id. at 961.
171 Id. at 961–62.
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In imposing higher requirements, the court emphasized the amount of personal infor-
mation carried by international travelers on computers,172 and the potentially confi-
dential and sensitive nature of that information.173 As a result, the court concluded that
a finding of “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity is a prerequisite to a forensic
examination of a computer.174 However, the court also concluded that customs of-
ficials did, in fact, have a reasonable suspicion that Cotterman was involved in crim-
inal activity.175
United States v. McAuley176 is another trial court decision that broadly applies the
border-search exception to electronics equipment. In that case, the defendant, who was
suspected of being involved in child pornography, arrived at the U.S. border carrying
a zip drive, two external hard drives, and a laptop.177 There was some dispute regarding
whether the defendant consented to the search of his computer; the defendant claimed
that he did not.178 Nevertheless, the subsequent search revealed the existence of child
pornography on an external hard drive.179 The defendant claimed that a computer search
is “non-routine” and that probable cause or reasonable suspicion should be required as
a prerequisite to a search of a computer’s contents.180 The court reaffirmed the idea that
“routine” border searches lie squarely within the scope of governmental authority.181
172 Electronic devices are capable of storing warehouses full of information.
The average 400—gigabyte laptop hard drive can store over 200 million
pages—the equivalent of five floors of a typical academic library. Even a
car full of packed suitcases with sensitive documents cannot hold a candle
to the sheer, and ever-increasing, capacity of digital storage.
Id. at 964 (citations omitted).
173 The nature of the contents of electronic devices differs from that of lug-
gage as well. Laptop computers, iPads and the like are simultaneously
offices and personal diaries. They contain the most intimate details of our
lives: financial records, confidential business documents, medical records
and private emails. This type of material implicates the Fourth Amend-
ment’s specific guarantee of the people’s right to be secure in their
“papers.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The express listing of papers “reflects
the Founders’ deep concern with safeguarding the privacy of thoughts
and ideas—what we might call freedom of conscience—from invasion by
the government.” Seljan, 547 F.3d at 1014 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
174 Id. at 968.
175 Id. at 970.
176 563 F. Supp. 2d 672 (W.D. Tex. 2008), aff’d, 420 F. App’x 400 (5th Cir. 2011) (affirming
on the theory that McAuley consented to the search).
177 Id. at 674.
178 Id. at 674–75.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 676.
181 The border search doctrine is one of the few exceptions that allow a
warrantees search at a port of entry. “Agents may conduct a ‘routine’
search—one that does not seriously invade a traveler’s privacy at the
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Moreover, the court defined the following activities as falling squarely within the scope
of that “routine” authority, which “require no justification other than the person’s deci-
sion to cross our national boundary”: “ordinary pat-downs and frisks, removal of outer
garments and shoes, and the emptying of pockets, wallets, and purses.”182 However, a
“non-routine” search (such as a body-cavity search or a strip search) requires “reason-
able suspicion” that the individual is involved in criminal activity.183 Defendant argued
that a computer search is like a strip search (or other non-routine searches) because
computers contain private information.184 However, the court viewed a computer search
as more analogous to a search of an automobile or its contents.185 The court justified its
decision as follows:
Incredible amounts of personal and sensitive information are
already subject to scrutiny at ports of entry in peoples’ wallets,
purses, locked glove boxes, and locked containers or luggage.
People carry personal items such as Social Security cards; state
and federal identification cards; medicines and medical records;
names and addresses of family and associates; day planners with
itineraries and travel documents; credit cards; check books and
registries; business cards; photographs; and membership cards.
All of these items are already subject to routine border searches. A
computer is simply an inanimate object made up of microproces-
sors and wires which happens to efficiently condense and digitize
the information reflected by the items listed above. The fact that
a computer may take such personal information and digitize it does
not alter the Court’s analysis.186
Moreover, to the court, it made no difference that the computer was password
protected.187
international border or its functional equivalent without probable cause, a
warrant, or any suspicion to justify the search.” Roberts, 274 F.3d at 1011.
The key variable used to determine whether a search is “routine” is “the
invasion of the privacy and dignity of the individual.”
Id.
182 Id. (quoting United States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 1163, 1169 (5th Cir. 1981)).
183 See Sandler, 644 F.2d at 1169 n.6.
184 McAuley, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 677.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 678 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1148 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1993).
187 While the Defendant’s computer was password protected, it too does not
effect this Court’s analysis. A password on a computer does not automati-
cally convert a routine search into a non-routine search. A password is
simply a digital lock. Locks are usually present on luggage and briefcases,
594 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 22:571
So, while the court of appeals’ decision in Cotterman suggested that border
searches should be limited in scope, absent proof of cause for a more extended search,
two trial court decisions go the other way. Moreover, the DHS takes the position that
it has broad authority under the border search exception.188
B. Border Searches for Information Making Unaccompanied Crossings of the
U.S. Border
The border-search doctrine becomes even more problematic if it is applied to any
physical object or communication that crosses the United States’ international borders,
and today many electronic communications cross those borders every day. Some of that
information moves entirely electronically. The most obvious sources of such movement
are e-mails or Skype communications sent across the border. Do governmental officials
have the right to “inspect” and review all e-mails or other communications that cross
the U.S. border?
In theory, it is arguable whether the Fourth Amendment applies to international
Internet communications at all. In Cotterman, the trial court held that there is no reason-
able expectation of privacy in items crossing the international borders.189 Before the
Fourth Amendment applies at all, there must be a “search” or a “seizure” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.190 The U.S. Supreme Court has struggled to define
the term “search” in an electronic era.191 “[W]hen the Fourth Amendment was drafted
and ratified, the state of surveillance technology was relatively crude and simplistic, and
the ability of the government to pry into the lives of private citizens was much more cir-
cumscribed.”192 In drafting the Fourth Amendment, the new Americans were focused
on abuses committed by the British during the colonial period, in particular their use of
writs of assistance and general warrants to make actual physical searches of houses, per-
sons, papers, and effects.193 Moreover, the Framers of the Fourth Amendment could
hardly have envisioned the surveillance technologies that would later be developed or
yet those items are subject to “routine” searches at ports of entry all
the time.
McAuley, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 679.
188 See HOMELAND SECURITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 2–3.
189 United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068, 1079, 1085 (9th Cir. 2011).
190 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment is not violated unless an official search or seizure has occurred).
191 See Russell L. Weaver, The Fourth Amendment, Privacy and Advancing Technology,
80 MISS. L.J. 1131, 1150 (2010) [hereinafter James Otis Lecture] (“While the concepts of
‘trespassory invasions’ and ‘intrusions into constitutionally protected areas’ may have made
sense as applied to a house, a car, or a briefcase, those concepts did not produce satisfactory
results as advancing technology provided police investigators with ever more sophisticated
surveillance technologies.”).
192 Id. at 1138.
193 Id.
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that such technologies would allow governmental officials to spy on citizens without
actually entering their homes or touching their persons.194
Because of the context in which the Fourth Amendment developed, the U.S.
Supreme Court originally defined the term “search” in a narrow way that focused only
on the historical abuses that concerned the Framers.195 The Framers were familiar with
actual physical searches by British officials of persons, houses, papers, and effects; thus,
the Court tended to define the term “search” by reference to actual physical searches
of areas or persons and frequently inquired whether governmental officials had in-
truded or trespassed into a “constitutionally protected area.”196 If the police broke into
someone’s house (or, for that matter, an automobile), and thoroughly searched it, the
courts concluded that the police had intruded upon a constitutionally protected area and
therefore had committed a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.197
By the twentieth century, although advances in police surveillance technology had
begun to present significant challenges to the Court’s historical definition of the term
search, the Court continued to focus on whether police or governmental officials had
intruded or trespassed into constitutionally protected areas.198 However, the Justices
began to actively debate whether the Court should continue to follow its historical
approach or whether advances in technology suggested the need for a new and dif-
ferent approach.199
Early in the twentieth century, the Court was confronted by several different types
of cases that involved advancing technology.200 In general, although a number of
Justices were beginning to dissent,201 the Court continued to adhere to the idea that a
“search” required a “trespass” into a “constitutionally protected area.”202 In its land-
mark decision in Katz v. United States,203 the Court articulated a different approach
194 See id. at 1133.
195 See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147, 149 (1925); Hester v. United States,
265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (concluding that “the special protection accorded by the Fourth
Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ is not extended to
the open fields”).
196 See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438–39 (1963); Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 510–12 (1961).
197 See, e.g., Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153–54, 156.
198 See Weaver, James Otis Lecture, supra note 191, at 1139.
199 See id.
200 See, e.g., Silverman, 365 U.S. at 506–07 (involving use of a “spike mike” that was inserted
into defendant’s home and allowed police to overhear conversations occurring inside the home);
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 131–32 (1942) (involving use of a “detectaphone” that
allowed the police to overhear conversations that occurred in an adjoining office); Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456–57 (1928) (involving wiretapping devices placed outside
defendants’ homes and businesses).
201 See Weaver, James Otis Lecture, supra note 191, at 1150.
202 See id. at 1139.
203 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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for evaluating whether a search occurs. In that case, the Court focused on whether gov-
ernmental officials had violated Katz’s expectation of privacy.204 In doing so, the Court
shifted its Fourth Amendment focus from places to persons205 and inquired whether the
police had violated Katz’s “expectation of privacy.” The Court stated: “What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”206 Justice Harlan, concur-
ring, agreed with the Court that the focus should be on whether Katz had an expectation
of privacy (EOP), but he argued that the expectation must be one that society was pre-
pared to recognize as reasonable.207 Ultimately, Harlan’s requirement of “reasonable-
ness” was integrated into the EOP test, such that the Court inquired whether the police
had intruded upon an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” (REOP).208 The
trespass test did not entirely disappear.209
Under the Katz approach, there is a legitimate question about whether governmen-
tal officials conduct a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when
they intercept electronic communications that traverse international borders.210 An ordi-
nary person might readily conclude that the government performs a “search” when it
examines the content of his or her electronic communications. Many people assume
that their electronic communications are private—at least against governmental prying.
However, the cases mentioned earlier (suggesting that one has no REOP at the nation’s
borders) suggest otherwise. Moreover, in a number of cases, the Court has held that
individuals do not retain an REOP in information that they voluntarily turn over to
third parties.211 Since electronic communications usually go through multiple third
parties, and the sender “voluntarily” turns those communications over to those third
204 Id. at 351–52.
205 Id. at 351 (“For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”).
206 Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted).
207 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“As the Court’s opinion states, ‘the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places.’ The question, however, is what protection it affords to those people.
Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires reference to a ‘place.’ My understanding
of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that
a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expec-
tation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
208 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
209 See id. at 947 (“Katz did not repudiate the understanding that the Fourth Amendment em-
bodies a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas it enumerates.”).
210 See Weaver, James Otis Lecture, supra note 191, at 1193–95.
211 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that police use of a pen register
to record the phone numbers called by an individual did not constitute a search); United States
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that there was no search where the government seized
checks and other bank records that defendant had turned over to a bank); Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322 (1973) (holding that there was no search where the government seized books and
other documents from an accountant to which defendant had delivered them).
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parties, legitimate questions might be raised about whether they are accompanied by
an REOP so that governmental examination of electronic communications constitutes
a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. On the bright side, for those
who believe that the government’s seizure of electronic communications should be
regarded as searches, Katz held that the police committed a “search” when they used
a listening device to overhear a conversation that took place over a public phone and
therefore was sent through a third party (the phone company) to a third party (the re-
cipient of the phone call).212 However, Katz has provided limited protection in subse-
quent decisions.213
Even if the government’s review of electronic communications constitutes a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it is not at all clear that the Court would
require a warrant or probable cause for those searches. Case law from earlier periods
suggests that the government has the power to open and read letters and other docu-
ments that cross the borders of the United States. For example, in United States v.
Ramsey,214 a U.S. customs inspector opened incoming first class international mail with-
out a warrant, and also intercepted international phone calls.215 Although the applicable
administrative regulations permitted customs officials to search international mail
whenever they had “reasonable cause” to believe that the mail contained items prohib-
ited under U.S. law, the D.C. Court of Appeals invalidated the search on the basis that
it was conducted without a warrant or probable cause.216 As a result, Ramsey directly
addressed the question of whether the government had the power to review communica-
tions that crossed international borders.217 In doing so, the Court recognized broad
212 The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from which the
petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as
visible after he entered it as he would have been if he had remained out-
side. But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the
intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do so
simply because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen.
No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend’s apartment, or
in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection
of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind
him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast
to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital
role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
213 See Weaver, James Otis Lecture, supra note 191, at 1158–59.
214 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
215 Id. at 608–10.
216 Id. at 611.
217 Id. at 619–20 (“Respondents urge upon us, however, the position that mailed letters are
somehow different, and, whatever may be the normal rule with respect to border searches, dif-
ferent considerations, requiring the full panoply of Fourth Amendment protections, apply to inter-
national mail.”).
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authority on the part of the U.S. government to conduct border searches: “[S]earches
made at the border, pursuant to the long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself
by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reason-
able simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border, should, by now, require
no extended demonstration.”218 The Court went on to further emphasize the scope of
federal power:
This acknowledgment of plenary customs power was differentiated
from the more limited power to enter and search “any particular
dwelling—house, store, building, or other place” where a warrant
upon “cause to suspect” was required. The historical importance of
the enactment of this customs statute by the same Congress which
proposed the Fourth Amendment is, we think, manifest.219
In Ramsey, the Court indicated that the breadth of federal authority at the nation’s
borders “has been faithfully adhered to” by the Court.220
In the Court’s view, the government had the right to examine letters and other cor-
respondence that crossed the nation’s borders.221 It mattered not whether the letters were
being carried across the border by an individual, or whether they had been sent through
the U.S. mail:
It is clear that there is nothing in the rationale behind the border-
search exception which suggests that the mode of entry will be crit-
ical. It was conceded at oral argument that customs officials could
search, without probable cause and without a warrant, envelopes
carried by an entering traveler, whether in his luggage or on his
person. Surely no different constitutional standard should apply
simply because the envelopes were mailed, not carried. The critical
fact is that the envelopes cross the border and enter this country,
not that they are brought in by one mode of transportation rather
than another. It is their entry into this country from without it that
makes a resulting search “reasonable.”222
Justice Stevens, joined by two other Justices, challenged the Court’s interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment, citing the historic respect accorded by the Court to the private
218 Id. at 616.
219 Id. at 616–17.
220 Id. at 617.
221 See id. at 621–22.
222 Id. at 620 (citation omitted).
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communications of individuals.223 He noted, “[i]f the Government is allowed to exercise
the power it claims, the door will be open to the wholesale, secret examination of all
incoming international letter mail. No notice would be necessary either before or after
the search.”224
In a similar vein, in United States v. Seljan,225 customs inspectors opened a sealed
envelope containing personal correspondence. Since the search took place at the na-
tion’s borders, the Court held that the search was valid under the Fourth Amendment.226
CONCLUSION
The administrative exception to the warrant requirement is well-recognized, and
has led to a variety of administratively related doctrines and offshoots. Under that ex-
ception, the Court has altered the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and particularity
requirements, dispensed with the requirement of a warrant for some administrative
searches, and provided the government with broad powers to search at the nation’s
international borders.
It is not clear that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment really intended for ad-
ministrative inspections to be treated differently than other inspections or searches.227
Following the British colonial period, the new American colonists were incensed re-
garding the use of writs of assistance and general warrants by British colonial officials,
and these writs and warrants had frequently been used in administrative contexts.228 In
particular, they had been used by customs officials.229 As a result, it is not clear that his-
torical considerations justify a line of demarcation between administrative inspections
and other searches.
If the special (and reduced) status accorded to administrative searches ever did
make sense, it continues to make sense in a modern technologically driven society. As
technology has changed, the administrative exception has potentially far-reaching con-
sequences for individual privacy. This is especially true for the border exception. The
broad scope of governmental authority provided by this exception might have made
sense in earlier times. No one disputes the notion that the U.S. government has the right
to make sure that those who seek to enter the United States have the right to enter, and
that they are not carrying contraband. As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court has always
given the United States broad powers to conduct border searches. However, it is not
223 Id. at 626 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The notion that private letters could be opened and in-
spected without notice to the sender or the addressee is abhorrent to the tradition of privacy and
freedom to communicate protected by the Bill of Rights.”).
224 Id. at 632.
225 547 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2008).
226 Id. at 1011.
227 See Weaver, James Otis Lecture, supra note 191, at 1138, 1140, 1176.
228 Id. at 1138.
229 Id. at 1131–33 & nn.4 & 6.
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clear that the government’s right to conduct border searches can or should give the gov-
ernment the right to search (or retain or copy) computers and electronic devices at the
nation’s borders, or the right to intercept international electronic searches. Computers
(including iPhones, thumb drives, etc.) can store large amounts of information, includ-
ing much personal information. Indeed, given that some computers are programmed to
connect to cloud storage sites, the government’s ability to access a personal computer
can give the government access to virtually all of the “papers” and “documents” in an
individual’s life. At least some of this information will be personal and confidential, and
border officials should not be allowed to routinely search computers, iPhones, and other
electronic devices.
As the courts grapple with these issues, they will be forced to determine the stan-
dard to be applied to detailed searches of electronic devices. The court of appeals’ deci-
sion in Cotterman suggests that customs officials should be allowed to make routine
and cursory searches of electronic files without cause, but they should be required
to show “reasonable suspicion” in order to conduct a more detailed forensic exami-
nation.230 Whether the “reasonable suspicion” standard provides enough protection
against a computer search is debatable. In Cotterman, an individual’s computer was
seized, sent to a distant place, and held for several days.231 One can argue that such an
“intrusion” on individual privacy should require a warrant based on probable cause.
Undoubtedly, the government’s decision to seize and hold someone’s computer can
have important personal and business consequences for that individual.
230 See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 968 (9th Cir. 2013).
231 Id. at 956.
